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Evolutionary game theory (EGT) provides a powerful tool with which to unpack the interactive strategies
of polluting enterprises (PEs), local government regulators (LG), and central government planners (CG) in
China. Here, the prevailing institutional system of fiscal decentralization sees regulatory mandates set by
the CG and enforced at the LG level. This delegation shapes managers' incentives when deciding the
degree to which firms will incur costs to reduce pollution and comply with state directives. Manager's
choice sets draw shape from decisions at the LG level, where regulators balance the pursuit of envi-
ronmental quality with the economic payoffs of tacit collusion with industry. LG and PEs incentives
reciprocally shape and draw shape from outcomes at the CG level, where policymakers decide the degree
to which they will support and supervise the behavior of LGs. By exploring the evolution of different
participants' behavior and their evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in line with the duplication of dynamic
equations, EGT enables a robust, quantitative analysis of this iterative, interactive, three-player game. A
numerical example serves to verify the theoretical results and support four key insights. First, the se-
lection of environmental strategies manifest in a dynamic process of constant adjustment and optimi-
zation. Second, LGs outperform by integrating decisions from both CG and PEs in weighing alternative
environmental strategies. Third, reducing regulatory costs at the CG level cascades to strengthen pen-
alties for local violations and improve mitigation incentives in ways that aid an evolutionary game to
converge on an ideal decision state. Fourth, a stable equilibrium cannot persist to allow LGs to sustain
behaviors towards a “race to the bottom”, even in the total absence of central regulation or high levels of
dominance of polluting firms of LG regulators. EGT thus not only outcomes shed light on the full variation
set of game outcomes, it also reveals the consequences of variable levels of collusion between LGs and
PEs and options for the redesign of incentive mechanisms to reform the regulatory regime and improve
market outcomes in China.
© 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
After more than 30 years of reform and expansion, China has
made great economic and social progress (Lin et al., 2003). How-
ever, remarkable economic expansion has brought about an equallyand Economics, Tianjin Uni-
), youdaming2001@163.com
ong@tju.edu.cn (Z. Li).concentrated deterioration of environmental quality, as the envi-
ronmental impacts seen over 100 years of industrialization in many
developed countries have emerged in just 30 years. China's
decentralized regulatory model of fiscal decentralization has
played a central role in shaping this dynamic, recent history of rapid
industrialization. Fiscal decentralization involves in a system
grounded in top down policymaking, local implementation, and
intensive levels of interregional competition (Montinola et al.,
1995). Political leadership hinges on an ever-changing composi-
tion of multi-level government, regulatory powers and authority
for environmental governance conform to administrative divisions,
Fig. 1. Interaction between multi-agents.
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legal property rights for environmental resources.
In examining tensions and trade-offs between rapid in-
dustrializations and environmental governance, mainstream liter-
ature on China's development has subscribed primarily to a
perspective of competitive enterprise production aligned by effi-
cient government regulation (Du et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2015;
Zhang et al., 2017). The implicit assumption holds that formal in-
stitutions strictly control China's environmental governance and
performance. In other words, with a few notable exceptions (Yee
et al., 2014; Cao et al., 2016) most studies assume that environ-
mental regulation policies at the local government level are rational
and effective.
However, recent strengthening of environmental regulation in
China has appeared not to significantly arrest the deterioration of
environmental quality (Li et al., 2016). For example, critics regularly
cite ongoing struggles with very high levels of ambient air pollution
(Sueyoshi and Yuan, 2015; Zhang et al., 2016), as observed in a
classic case in 2013 when smog enveloped 25 provinces and more
than 100 large and medium-sized cities in China to form the
world's foremost wide scale environmental disaster (Chen and
Chen, 2018). A major reason for the apparent lag in the literature
to recognize the limitations of centralized reform lies in an absence
of explicit recognition that local regulators face dual constraints of
“political centralization and economic decentralization” (Chen and
Gao, 2012).
Under a prevailing model of interregional competition, execu-
tives of environmental regulatory agencies embedded among local
authorities have competing incentives to allow or even encourage
polluting enterprises (PEs) to compete for limited environmental
resources within a jurisdiction. To maximize economic outputs (He
et al., 2016), local government (LG) administrators regularly sub-
sume the autonomy of local environmental regulators to collude
with polluting industries in a quintessential “race to the bottom”
(Konisky, 2007; Tao et al., 2009). Firms also regularly take an active
role in bribing or otherwise colluding with government officials (Jia
and Nie, 2017) to transfer the external costs of production onto local
residents and the environment (Zhou, 2007).
Thus, fragmentation of regulatory incentives across multiple
structural levels may undermine the driving force of China's envi-
ronmental governance e the central mandate e enervating the
power of the state to preserve environmental quality (Zhao and
Sun, 2016). In view of the huge environmental rent-seeking per-
sisting under the current arrangement (Chen et al., 2016), strategic
interactions between the CG, LGs and PEs warrants additional study
to inform the future of environmental regulation in China.
The fiscal decentralization literature (Han and Kung, 2015; He,
2015; Yang, 2016) has made systematic advances in modeling the
overlay of incentives between governmental layers in China, but
has largely failed to model the strategic dynamics of environmental
regulation and firm behavior that drive environmental quality
outcomes. This study sets out to fill this gap using evolutionary-
game-based learning theory (Samuelson, 2002; Shubik, 2002)
and a series of quantitative simulation analyses. EGT is a promising
tool with which to model social dilemmas grounded in problems of
individual cooperation (Wu et al., 2017), allowing researchers to
delineate and simulate mutually interactive outcomes among game
players or groups whose strategic behaviors shape each other's
payoffs.
This toolset is particularly well suited to the Chinese context.
Here, regulatory mandates set by the CG are implemented at the LG
level. The central government's decisions to set the stringency of its
regulatory mandate and its willingness to enforce that mandate on
its local agents shape - and are shaped - by the choices of the local
regulator. At the firm level, managers decide the degree to whichthey will incur costs to mitigate pollution and so comply with local
regulation. The LG regulator sits in the middle, balancing the pur-
suit of environmental quality in compliance with CG mandate with
the economic payoffs of colluding with industry. The interaction
between multi-agents is described in Fig. 1. Over time, each player
may converge towards full enforcement/regulation/mitigation,
respectively, a 1:1:1 outcome representing what an environmental
fundamentalist might describe as an ideal state. By exploring the
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the different participants'
behavior, EGT enables a robust, quantitative analysis of this itera-
tive, interactive, three-player game and, in doing so, seeks insights
to inform recommendations for reform.
This study seeks to address three primary research questions
through the analysis of strategic interactions and outcomes in this
three-player game. First, it seeks to understand the implications of
the mezzanine position of LG regulators as “bridging architecture”,
linking together the mitigation decisions of firmmanagers with the
mandate calculus of the central government. To this end, it seeks
patterns by which differences in the initial values of the game
translate into various equilibrium outcomes after multiple rounds.
More specifically, the analysis seeks insights into ways in which
variations in the relative influence of PEs and the CG on the payoffs
of LG regulators shape outcomes. It also hopes to understand how
differences in this “relative sensitivity” of the LG regulator shape
the later-stage payoffs for the other players' strategic choices.
Second, this study sets out to understand how the first-round
position (“choice proportion”) of various agents (PE/LG/CG) influ-
ence the game evolution pathway and the speed of convergence
towards the ideal state (1:1:1) in a stylized, ten-round game. In the
marketplace - holding the behavior of CG constant e the studyis
interested in the influence of LG's starting position on PE's game
path (CG || LG0 ¼> PE1-8) and vice versa (CG || PE0 ¼> LG1-8). In the
fiscally decentralized state - holding the behavior of PE constant e
it investigates the influence of CG's starting position on LG's game
path (PE || CG0 ¼> LG1-8) and vice versa (PE || LG0 ¼> CG1-8).
Third, this study seeks to uncover specific conditions that
appear to encourage convergence towards the ideal state charac-
terized by central enforcement, local implementation and corpo-
rate mitigation (1:1:1). It is particularly interested in the relative
importance of costs and benefits for all three parties, theways these
relative “weightings” shape strategic interactions between coun-
terparties, and the influence of changes in these weightings on
rates of strategic convergence as the three actors make progress
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In answering these questions, this study makes three below
contributions. This study first provides improved understanding of
the fiscal decentralization system underlying current Chinese
environmental policies. EGT analysis shows how the local regula-
tors' political incentives shape the efficiency of environmental
regulation and underscore recent advances in the environmental
politics literature that emphasize the importance of politics in
influencing policy outputs andmarket outcomes (Moore, 2014; Cao
et al., 2016).
Second, this study deviates from mainstream EGT research
focused primarily on two-player games of identical or different
subjects (Dal Bo and Frechette, 2011; Liu, 2015). By advancing the
multi-agent matrix analysis, this study helps bridge a methodo-
logical gap between EGT applications and multi-level regulatory
games such as might appear to prevail under Chinese fiscal
decentralization policy. Multi-agent modeling returns insights with
broader applicability to policymakers working in such environs. For
example, the model reveals a series of strategic choices by which
decision-makers may to improve the efficiency of environmental
governance.
Third, in cross walking the simulation model to a real world
case, the analysis verifies a dynamic process of constant adjustment
and optimization and defining initial thresholds based on a real
world example to sheds light on sufficient conditions that appear to
promote more rapid convergence of the three-party game towards
an ideal state. This study thus illustrates how reductions in regu-
latory costs at the CG level cascade to strengthen penalties for local
violations and improve mitigation incentives that in turn spur
converge towards the optimal end state of centrally-oriented,
locally-promoted and enterprise-enacted pollution mitigation.
The remainder of this study progresses as follows. Section 2
reviews a selection of relevant literature informing the research
questions and the design of the research approach. Section 3 details
methods, including the establishment of gamemodel as well as the
replicator dynamic and ESS analysis of each agent. Section 4 then
advances a numerical cased-based example, to verify the effec-
tiveness of the proposed game-theoretic modeling. Section 5
summarizes major results and key points of discussion, and Sec-
tion 6 provides summary conclusions and policy implications.
2. Literature review
2.1. Fiscal decentralization and environmental regulation
Scholars have investigated the influence of environmental
regulation on economic growth in China by examining regulatory
impacts on factors like foreign direct investment (FDI), industrial
innovation and technological progress (Song et al., 2013; Chan et al.,
2016; Yuan and Xiang, 2018). These studies broadly regard envi-
ronmental pollution as an economic output and regulation as a
lever of trade-off. Yet most have made little headway in uncovering
the underlying drivers of effectiveness or efficiency for regulation
itself. Indeed, relegating the phenomena of governance to a black
box of government administration seems problematic, because it
renders invisible so many important and dynamic sources of reg-
ulatory influence and constraint (Lin et al., 2014). Such oversight
seems particularly untenable in China, as existing models drawn
from outside contexts show only limited applicability to the Chi-
nese case of fiscal decentralization.
For example, in the United States, scholars widely assert models
of environmental federalism as credible maps with which to
navigate and anticipate regulatory outcomes at different levels of
government. These operationalize the observed roles of de-
partments at various levels of government that work in tandem todesign and implement a variety of environmental regulations. Early
proponents of the environmental federalism model have argued
that LGs possess efficiency and information advantages in
providing local public goods (Tiebout, 1956; Musgrave, 1959; Oates,
1972) that inspire and sustain the institutional form. Later theorists
have adapted the idea within a model of market-preserving
federalism (Weingast, 1995), in which decentralized institutional
arrangements provide incentives for LGs to ensure and facilitate a
steady process of efficient marketization of public goods.
Yet these models may have only very limited transferability to
China, where the central government takes a very limited role in
enforcement, where critical central public goods are often absent,
and where subnational authorities enjoy very few robust rights to
preserve local assets from top-down interference or appropriation
from the central state (Qian and Weingast, 1997). Unlike many
developed countries, the administrative system in China possesses
another important feature, fiscal decentralization, whereby LGs are
responsible to higher authorities primarily for economic growth.
Heightened responsiveness to economic mandates has been
instrumental for mobilizing enthusiasm among LGs to pursue rapid
industrialization. However, research also shows fiscal decentral-
ization frequently proves inefficient in mobilizing LGs to provide
public goods and services like environmental protection (Wang and
Qin, 2008; Zhang et al., 2017).
The main reason for this shortfall is that the CG confers limited
decision-making power and economic autonomy upon local gov-
ernments in delegating authority over market actors. LGs are not
only a representative of the CG for regulation, but also an agent for
promoting local economic development, thereby indicating that
there exists a complex principal-agent relationship between the
two level governments (Yan and Wang, 2015). On the one hand,
Chinese decentralization and performance evaluation system based
on economic growth has led LGs to become hyper-competitive to
attract inflows of external capital (Zhou et al., 2004). On the other,
deregulation by LGs has led to a steady decline in environmental
quality and resulted in a clear “race to the bottom” effect (Ding
et al., 2016) in contradiction to CG mandates to ensure environ-
mental quality.
Previous studies of the governance interplay in China (Li and
Zhou, 2005; Li and Wu, 2017) have laid a solid foundation for this
study. Under political centralization and fiscal decentralization, LGs
possess dual characteristics as both “politicians” and “economic
participants”. LGs thus balance decisions along two dimensions:
first, to determine whether to work toward the provision of pro-
ductive public goods under central supervision, and second,
whether to seek to obtain greater profits from collusion with EPs
(Yan and Wang, 2015). As result, the essence of environmental
regulation strategy emerges as a dynamic, three party game process
among relevant participants.
2.2. Application of EGT in environmental regulation
In contexts where players often cannot ascertain or obtain an
optimized strategy by only one choice, they necessary default to
strategies based in limited individual rationality (Binmore, 1988).
Such cases proliferate in the real world economies, where out-
comes are influenced by multiple factors such as the external
environment, existing and emerging information, cognitive con-
strains, and scarce time resources for making and assessing de-
cisions. To overcome the hypothesis of perfect rationality in the
general game, Weibull (1997) develops the core precepts of EGT.
The core idea of EGT is that interactions between individuals in a
group shape a dynamic process of moves and counter-moves,
nested with a constantly changing game environment. Based on
the starting strategies and relative sensitivities of players' strategies
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becomes interdependent with the behavior of the participants
(Smith and Price, 1973). A process of dynamic strategy emerges
which, through processes of learning, ultimately leads individuals
to an equilibrium solution.
EGT has been increasingly employed in evolutionary economics
and environmental policies (Faber and Frenken, 2009). In a novel
application by Ji et al. (2015), EGT has proven useful in accounting
forinter-firm dynamics in the recycling choices of different kinds of
material waste producers and the cooperative tendencies of various
stakeholders (buyer and suppliers) in an externality-producing
value chain. EGT aids the author in determining pathways for the
manufacturing industry to attain stable patterns of sustainable
resource management, be revealing ways in which the recycling
capability of various suppliers directly shapes downstream in-
centives across the supply chain. In other work, Zhao et al. (2016)
use EGT to derive system dynamics from data on Chinese air
conditioner firms to examine the impact of a carbon emission
reduction labeling scheme on firm-level strategy, and find that
subsidies and preferential taxes have complementary influence on
the efficacy of the labeling policy to inspire clean-up. More recently,
Wu et al. (2017) model low-carbon strategies in a complex network
context to explore how companies compete and transform in the
small-world network in ways that allow regulation to encourage
firms to disseminate low-carbon practices, while Chen and Hu
(2018) apply EGT to study manufacturers' strategies to deal with
environmental regulation like carbon taxes and subsidies where
abatement options prove expensive.
Additionally, scholars have begun to employ EGT to investigate
the impact of third-party environmental regulatory policies. EGT
has proven useful in anticipating pathways and patterns of
persistence by which social groups push firms to comply with
environmental laws and regulations (Post et al., 2011), public
participation compensates for the shortcomings of “government
intervention” and “market mechanism” (Huang, 2015; Song et al.,
2018), and social media incentivizes signaling related to corporate
sustainability (Tseng, 2017).
EGT has proved a promising tool for analyzing both corporate
strategies under environmental supervision as well as the behav-
ioral interactions between LGs. Nevertheless, studies of strategic
interactions between multiple actors and the influence of those
interactions on regulatory and market outcomes remains scarce.
Under accelerating fiscal decentralization, LGs in China have ac-
quired independent interests and behavioral capabilities leading to
conflicts of interest and misaligned objectives in the implementa-
tion of environmental regulation. Given the resonance of the sub-
jective rationality hypothesis under such conditions, this study
employs EGT to consider the impact of changes in strategic
behavior among different regulatory agents and market partici-
pants. Findings show relevance to the broader context of Chinese
fiscal decentralization and inform policy prescriptions of practical
benefit to the efficient implementation of China's environmental
strategy.
3. Methods
3.1. Problem description and basic assumptions
Under “fiscal decentralization”, the CG develops a unified
environmental policy, which LGs are responsible for implementing
in their respective jurisdictions. Due to the excessive length of the
information transfer chain between the central and lower gov-
ernment levels, local officials possess sufficient capacity to control
“private information” and shape the “natural state” within their
jurisdictions. This dynamic supports a strong opportunist tendencyfor LGs to underreport and generally deprioritize environmental
problems. Two-level governments generally work to balance the
relationship between environmental regulation and economic
growth, such that when the CG intervenes to monitor and/or re-
form environmental policies by local governments, the CG con-
fronts constraints of information asymmetry and limited central
capacity. Conversely, LGs also possess only incomplete information
regarding the payoffs of complying with central government reg-
ulations. These dynamics of administrative and economic decen-
tralization form the foundation of a game relationship between the
two levels of government in the enforcement of environmental
regulation.
Meanwhile, LGs respond to the private interests of enterprises,
which oftentimes provide opportunities for regulators to collude
with businesses to forego enforcement in the interest of tax reve-
nue and industrial growth. This results in derivative corruption and
local regulation strategies based in purposeful, partial imple-
mentation. In other words, under such decentralized system, LGs
act more like “operators of profit-seeking regimes”, concerned
more with short-term economic development than environmental
governance. Collusive incentives for both enterprises and local
regulators further contribute to the formation of a game relation-
ship between LGs and PEs, completing the game process in which
LGs play a central, bridging role between the CG and PEs.
For functional simplicity, the evolutionary game model con-
ceives of the CG, LGs and PEs as singular, limited rational economic
persons. Informed by incomplete information, their behavioral
strategy is suboptimal at the start of any game. With the passage of
time, through learning and trial and error, gradually the players
distill more suitable strategies. Strategic choices in each round are
mutually independent and exclusive. Once a player selects a
strategy, it receives payoffs based on its mutually independent
payoff function. It then inspects the payoffs of the probable and
respective strategies of its counterparties to decide whether to
change its strategic choices in the next round of the game. Three
basic assumptions describe the strategy set for the three players in
anticipation of a game solution below.
Each LG proposed in this study has two pure strategic options: it
may select to fully implement environmental regulation policies,
such as regulating and reducing pollution emissions in its juris-
diction (Zhang and Cheng, 2009; Zheng et al., 2015), or elect to
pursue partial implementation with a mix of collusion with PEs
(Chen et al., 2014; Nie and Zhang, 2015; Jia and Nie, 2017). LGs
select their enforcement level mindful of the previous and probable
imminent choices of CG and PEs. The strategy set is {complete
implementation, partial implementation}, denoted by y2[0,1] and
1 y, respectively.
Next, taking into account the previous and probable imminent
choices of LGs, the central authority canperform fully enforced
measures, such as inspecting regional energy consumption, setting
carbon emissions targets (Liu et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2017) and
imposing economic sanctions on penalties (fines, taxes or carbon
charges) (Tanaka, 2011; Ouchida and Goto, 2014), or choose to
partially enforcement. The strategy set is {complete enforcement,
partial enforcement}. In the initial stage of each three game agent, if
the proportion that the CG chooses the complete regulation strat-
egy is x2[0,1], the proportion of partial regulation strategy, in
accordance, becomes 1 x.
Last, taking into account the previous and probable imminent
choices LG, the emissions of PEs are determined by their production
scale, and for emission reductions under certain conditions, the
selected strategy of PEs is generally affected by their capabilities,
resources, and market forces (Tian et al., 2014), so that they can
choose a higher level of pollution control inputs or a lower one. The
strategy set is {completely mitigation, partially mitigation}, and the
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z2[0,1] and 1 z, separately. Table 1 shows the basic variables
symbol and definitions.3.2. Evolutionary game model
When LGs implement the environmental regulation strategy
entirely, its implementation costs are recorded as C1, and the de-
gree of implementation effort is denoted by l12(0,1). Under full
implementation, local economic development will suffer a certain
loss R2. In contrast, environmental quality gains represent a profit
R1. When LGs do not fully implement, they also incur political
losses R3 from the local populace and further incur administrative
penalties F , levied by the CG. Supposing LGs have an opportunity to
solicit bribes from PEs within their jurisdiction; under partial
implementation, LG may expect to receive a reasonable amount of
collusive benefits E, but corresponding will bear a further element
of expected losses L1 to public goods including the trust of the
population. To model the heterogenous nature of LGs, the model
iterates using a series of descriptors to model the conditions of a
given LG player relative to the national average. In specific,
g12[0,1] represents the ratio of local environmental quality to the
national environmental quality; g22[0,1] indicates the percentage
of local economic development to mainland economic develop-
ment; g32[0,1] expresses the influence coefficient of local political
credibility to the total national political credibility.
Turning to the CG, the model anticipates first that LGs' economic
development, environmental quality, and government credibility
hold an equal value to the CG's payoff function as its own national
interests.
When the CG regulates the LG's strategic behavior entirely, pays
for the cost of regulatory action C2, where the degree of enforce-
ment effort is l22(0,1). Moreover, incomplete regulation causes a
definite expected loss due to agency cost L2. Further, if LGs do not
fully implement their own regulatory strategy, this will force the CG
to engage in remediation and pay a remedy cost G in compensatory
governance.
For the PEs, lastly, abatement costs under complete emission
reduction is C3. The level of emission mitigation effort is recorded
as l32(0,1). Let 4 and q1 represent the taxation and emission re-
ductions, respectively, while discharges are expressed by q2 under
partial emission mitigation. D denotes the economic penalty
incurred for illegal emissions that are detected by implementing
LGs. LG may also allocate both a subsidy C3ð1 s1Þ and a form of
tax relief 4ð1 s2Þðq2  q1Þ to reward firms that cut emissions. The
degree of subsidization and tax deduction are s1 and s2, respec-
tively. The probability that PEs who do not completely cut emis-
sions are detected and punished by LGs is m. The implementation
effort and regulatory capacity of LGs thus serve as “inputs” to PEs
strategic calculus, while “outputs" include the probability of being
detected and punished by upper governments where PEs discharge
illegal emissions. A Cobb-Douglas production function (Meeusen
and van Den Broeck, 1977) informs the ready deduction of m ¼
el1
akb. Here, ereflects LG's environmental management capability
while k captures LGs' proficiency in applying regulatory techniques.
For simplicity, this study assumes that a ¼ b ¼ 1.Table 1
Variables symbol descriptions.
Variables Descriptions
x Probability that CG adopts an enforcement strategy (0 x 1)
y Probability that LGs adopt an implementation strategy (0 y  1)
z Probability that PEs adopt a mitigation strategy (0 z 1)The interactive strategic behavior among the tripartite mainstay
is thus shown in Fig. 2. Relevant notation and definitions are further
described in Table 2.
Based on the foregoing analysis, a payoff matrix of eight stra-
tegies among three game agents is established, as shown in Table 3.
The full range of interactive, strategic combinations is expressed
below.
Y
cg1
;
Y
lg1
;
Y
pe1

¼ ð  C2 þ g1R1  g2R2;C1 þ R1  R2
 s1C3 þ 4ð1 s2Þðq2
 q1Þ;C3ð1 s1Þ  4ð1 s2Þðq2
 q1ÞÞ
Y
cg2
;
Y
lg2
;
Y
pe2

¼ ð  C2 þ g1R1  g2R2;C1 þ R1  R2
þ 4ðq2  l3q1Þ þ kD;l3C3  4ðq2
 l3q1Þ  kDÞ
Y
cg3
;
Y
lg3
;
Y
pe3

¼ ð  C2  l1g3R3  Gþ F;l1C1  l1R3
þ ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ  F þ 4ðq2
 q1Þ;C3  4ðq2  q1ÞÞ
Y
cg4
;
Y
lg4
;
Y
pe4

¼ ð  C2  l1g3R3  Gþ F;l1C1  l1R3
þ ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ  F þ 4ðq2  l3q1Þ
þ el1kD;l3C3  4ðq2  l3q1Þ
 el1kDÞ
Y
cg5
;
Y
lg5
;
Y
pe5

¼ ð  l2C2 þ g1R1  g2R2
 L2ð1 l2Þ;C1 þ R1  R2  s1C3
þ 4ð1 s2Þðq2  q1Þ;C3ð1 s1Þ
 4ð1 s2Þðq2  q1ÞÞ
Y
cg6
;
Y
lg6
;
Y
pe6

¼ ð  l2C2 þ g1R1  g2R2
 L2ð1 l2Þ;C1 þ R1  R2 þ 4ðq2
 l3q1Þ þ kD;l3C3  4ðq2  l3q1Þ
 kD
Fig. 2. Interactive strategic behavior framework among multi-agents.
Table 2
Parameters symbol descriptions.
Parameters Descriptions
Ch Cost of different agent (h¼ 1,2,3)
lh Effort degree of different agents (0<lh<1)
q1 Total emission reductions
q2 Total amount of discharges
4 Emission tax rate
E Expected collusive benefits for LGs when 0<l1<1
L1 Expected public losses of LGs when 0<l1<1
L2 Expected agencies losses of the CG when 0<l2<1
R1 Expected environmental profits of LGs with full implementation
R2 Expected economy losses of LGs with full implementation
R3 Expected political losses of LGs with partial implementation
g1 The ratio of local environmental quality to national level
g2 The ratio of local economic level to national level
g3 The influence coefficient of local political credibility on national level
G Central environmental remedy cost with partial implementation of LGs
F Central penalties with partial implementation of LGs
s1 Subsidy payment proportion from LG to PE as reward for z¼ 1
s2 Tax deduction proportion from LG to PE as reward for z¼ 1
m Probability of being penalized from LGs with partial emission reductions of PEs
e Environmental management capability of LGs
k Regulatory proficiency of LGs
D Economic penalties from LGs with partial emission reductions of PEs
Table 3
Game payoff matrix among each game agent.
Complete Enforcement (x¼ 1) Partial Enforcement (0 x< 1)
Complete Implementation (y¼ 1) Partial Implementation (0 y<1) Complete Implementation (y¼ 1) Partial Implementation (0 y<1)
Complete Mitigation (z¼ 1) Q
cg1;
Q
lg1;
Q
pe1
 Q
cg3;
Q
lg3;
Q
pe3
 Q
cg5;
Q
lg5 ;
Q
pe5
 ðQcg7;Qlg7;Qpe7Þ
Partial Mitigation (0 z< 1) Q
cg2;
Q
lg2;
Q
pe2
 Q
cg4;
Q
lg4;
Q
pe4
 Q
cg6;
Q
lg6 ;
Q
pe6
 ðQcg8;Qlg8;Qpe8Þ
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cg7
;
Y
lg7
;
Y
pe7

¼ ð  l2C2  l1g3R3  L2ð1 l2Þ  l2G
þ l2F;l1C1  l1R3 þ ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ
 l2F þ 4ðq2  q1Þ;C3  4ðq2  q1ÞÞ
Y
cg8
;
Y
lg8
;
Y
pe8

¼ ð  l2C2  l1g3R3  L2ð1 l2Þ  l2G
þ l2F;l1C1  l1R3 þ ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ
 l2F þ 4ðq2  l3q1Þ þ el1kD;l3C3
 4ðq2  l3q1Þ  el1kDÞ3.3. Replicator dynamic analysis of each agent
In deriving the utility functions based on these matrixes, let U1
and U2 indicate the expected payoffs of the CG who adopts various
regulation strategies, i.e., completely or partial regulated. The ex-
pected utility of the CG becomes U12, giving:
U1 ¼ yz
Y
cg1
þ yð1 zÞ
Y
cg2
þ zð1 yÞ
Y
cg3
þ ð1 y zÞ
Y
cg4
(1)
U2 ¼ yz
Y
cg5
þ yð1 zÞ
Y
cg6
þ zð1 yÞ
Y
cg7
þ ð1 y zÞ
Y
cg8
(2)U12 ¼ xU1 þ ð1 xÞU2 (3)
Based on theMalthusian dynamic equation, when the income of
a strategy in one group is higher than the average earnings of other
strategies in a given round issue, that strategy can possess strong
resistance to prevent the invasion of the mutation strategy
(Friedman, 1991) and thus drive the adaptation of the group
evolutionary process. The consequent replicator dynamics equation
of xbecomes:
FðxÞ ¼ dx
dt
¼ xðU1  U12Þ
¼ xð1 xÞ½yð1 l2ÞðG FÞ  ð1 l2ÞðC2  L2 þ G FÞ 
(4)
Moreover, according to the stability theorem of differential
equations and the property of ESS, the ESS point must be robust to
minor disturbance. In specifically, when the value of x becomes
smaller than x, FðxÞ must be greater than zero. While when the
value of x becomes larger than x, FðxÞmust be smaller than zero. As
a consequence, to achieve ESS, FðxÞ ¼ 0 and F 0ðxÞ<0 are required,
similar for FðyÞ and FðzÞ. On this theoretical basis, the following
proposition is figured out at first.
Proposition 1.
(1) When y ¼ y* ¼ ð1l2ÞðC2L2þGFÞ=ð1l2ÞðGFÞ,
FðxÞ ¼ 0, all game strategies are at a steady state.
(2) When ysy*, supposing FðxÞ ¼ 0, then x ¼ 0and x ¼ 1are
two stable points of x.
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xcan be further calculated below:
F 0ðxÞ ¼ dFðxÞ
dx
¼ ð1 2xÞ½yð1 l2ÞðG FÞ  ð1 l2ÞðC2  L2 þ G FÞ 
(5)
Then, two circumstances are discussed separately according to
Eq. (5):
(i) If C2  L2 þ G F >G F , under the restraints of 0< x<1, 0<
y<1 and 0< z<1, it can be deduced that
yð1 l2ÞðG FÞ  ð1 l2ÞðC2  L2 þ G FÞ<0 holds,
F
0 ðxÞjx ¼ 0<0 and F 0 ðxÞjx ¼ 1>0.
Thus, x ¼ 0 is the ESS, as shown in Fig. 3(a1).
(ii) If C2  L2 þ G F <G F, then:
①When y> y*, F
0 ðxÞjx ¼ 0>0 and F 0 ðxÞjx ¼ 1<0. Thus,
x ¼ 1 is the ESS, as shown in Fig. 3(a2).
②When y< y*, F
0 ðxÞjx ¼ 0<0 and F 0 ðxÞjx ¼ 1>0. Thus,
x ¼ 0 is the ESS, as shown in Fig. 3(a2).Utilizing U3 and U4 to denote the expected payoffs of LGs that
select different implementation strategies, i.e., completely or par-
tial implemented. U34 represents the expected utility of LGs that
adopt the former two strategies, then:
U3 ¼ xz
Y
lg1
þ xð1 zÞ
Y
lg2
þ zð1 xÞ
Y
lg5
þ ð1 x zÞ
Y
lg6
(6)
U4 ¼ xz
Y
lg3
þ xð1 zÞ
Y
lg4
þ zð1 xÞ
Y
lg7
þ ð1 x zÞ
Y
lg8
(7)
U34 ¼ yU3 þ ð1 yÞU4 (8)
Therefore, the replicator dynamics equation of yis:
FðyÞ ¼ dy
dt
¼ yðU3  U34Þ
¼ yð1 yÞfxFð1 l2Þ  z½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ
þkDð1 el1Þ   C1ð1 l1Þ þ R1  R2 þ l1R3 þ l2F
ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þg
(9)Fig. 3. Replicator dynamic phase diagram of the CG.Proposition2.
(1) When
z ¼ z ¼ xFð1l2ÞC1ð1l1ÞþR1R2þl1R3þl2Fð1l1ÞðEL1ÞþkDð1el1Þ
s1C3þs24ðq2q1ÞþkDð1el1Þ
FðyÞ ¼ 0, all game strategies are at a steady state.
(2) When zsz, supposing FðyÞ ¼ 0, then y ¼ 0 and y ¼ 1 are
two stable points of y.Proof 2. The derivative of the replicator dynamics equation of y
can be calculated as below:
F 0ðyÞ ¼ dFðyÞ
dy
¼ ð1 2yÞ

xFð1 l2Þ  z½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ
þkDð1 el1Þ   C1ð1 l1Þ þ R1  R2 þ l1R3 þ l2F
ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þ

(10)
Then, two circumstances can be discussed separately according
to Eq. (10):
(i) If
C1ð1 l1Þ þ R1  R2 þ l1R3 þ l2F  ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ þ
kDð1 el1Þ> Fð1 l2Þ  ½s1C3þ s24ðq2  q1Þþ kDð1 el1Þ,
with 0< x<1, 0< y<1 and 0< z<1 constraints, it can be
further inferred that
xFð1 l2Þ  z½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ þ kDð1 al1Þ   C1ð1
l1Þ þ R1  R2 þ l1R3 þ l2F ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þ<
0 is constant, F
0 ðyÞjy ¼ 0<0 and F 0 ðyÞjy ¼ 1>0. Thus, y ¼ 0 is
the ESS, as shown in Fig. 4(b1).
(ii) If
C1ð1 l1Þ þ R1  R2 þ l1R3 þ l2F  ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ þ
kDð1 al1Þ< Fð1 l2Þ  ½s1C3þ s24ðq2  q1Þþ kDð1 el1Þ,
then:
①When z> z, F 0 ðyÞjy ¼ 0<0 and F 0 ðyÞjy ¼ 1>0. Thus,
y ¼ 0 is the ESS, as shown in Fig. 4(b2).
②When z< z, F 0 ðyÞjy ¼ 0>0 and F 0 ðyÞjy ¼ 1<0. Thus,
y ¼ 1 is the ESS, as shown in Fig. 4(b2).Supposing that U5 and U6 refer to the expected payoffs of PEs
that select different emission-reduction strategies, i.e., completely
or partial reduced emissions. U56 can be interpreted as the ex-
pected utility of PEs that adopt the former two strategies, then:
U5 ¼ xy
Y
pe1
þ xð1 yÞ
Y
pe3
þ yð1 xÞ
Y
pe5
þ ð1 x yÞ
Y
pe7
(11)Fig. 4. Replicator dynamic phase diagram of LGs.
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Y
pe2
þ xð1 yÞ
Y
pe4
þ yð1 xÞ
Y
pe6
þ ð1 x yÞ
Y
pe8
(12)
U56 ¼ zU5 þ ð1 zÞU6 (13)
Therefore, the replicator dynamics equation of z is:
FðzÞ ¼ dz
dt
¼ zðU5  U56Þ
¼ zð1 zÞfy½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þ 
½ð1 l3ÞðC3  4q1Þ  el1kD  g
(14)
Proposition3.
(1) When y ¼ y ¼ ð1l3ÞðC34q1Þel1kD
s1C3þs24ðq2q1ÞþkDð1el1Þ, FðzÞ ¼ 0, all game
strategies are at a steady state.
(2) When ysy, supposing FðzÞ ¼ 0, then z ¼ 0 and z ¼ 1 are
two stable points of z.Proof 3. Similarly, the derivative of the replicator dynamics
equation of z can be calculated as below:
F 0ðzÞ ¼ dFðzÞ
dz
¼ ð1 2zÞfy½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þ 
 ½ð1 l3ÞðC3  4q1Þ  el1kD  g
(15)
Accordingly, two circumstances are discussed separately ac-
cording to Eq. (15):
(i) If ð1 l3ÞðC3  4q1Þ el1kD>s1C3þ s24ðq2  q1Þþ
kDð1 el1Þ, under the conditions of 0< x<1, 0< y<1 and
0< z<1,
y½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þ   ½ð1 l3ÞðC3  4q1Þ 
el1kD <0 can be further demonstrated constant,
F
0 ðzÞjz ¼ 0<0 and F 0 ðzÞjz ¼ 1>0. Thus, z ¼ 0 is the ESS, as
shown in Fig. 5(c1).
(ii) If ð1 l3ÞðC3  4q1Þ el1kD<s1C3þ s24ðq2  q1Þþ
kDð1 el1Þ, then:
①When y> y, F 0 ðzÞjz ¼ 0>0 and F 0 ðzÞjz ¼ 1<0. Thus,
z ¼ 1 is the ESS, as shown in Fig. 5(c2).
②When y< y, F 0 ðzÞjz ¼ 0<0 and F 0 ðzÞjz ¼ 1>0. Thus,
z ¼ 0 is the ESS, as shown in Fig. 5(c2).3.4. ESS analysis of two replicator dynamic systems
From the replicator dynamics analysis of three agents above-Fig. 5. Replicator dynamic phase diagram of PEs.mentioned, it is guaranteed that, in the game model, changes in
the strategic behavior of the CG ðxÞ depend heavily on the strategic
selection of LGs ðyÞ, that is, x and y are correlated. Likewise, the
changes in the strategic behavior of PEs ðzÞ are closely related to y,
that is, z and y are correlated. In this study, it is feasible to analyze
the strategic action step-by-step between the two-level govern-
ments first. As such, z can be considered a constant first, and then
investigating the selected strategy between LGs and PEs, x can be
regarded as the constant that moment.
According to the EGT, the replicator dynamic equation reflects
the direction and speed of learning of a participant in this game.
When the replicator dynamic equation is zero, the stable states can
be determined by the equilibrium point involved. Let the replicated
dynamic system (I) is treated as the combining of Eq. (4) and Eq. (9),
i.e., the strategies of two-level governments is regarded as a
replicated dynamic system, then Proposition 4 is obtained below.
Proposition4. Five replicated dynamic equilibrium points exist in
the plane P ¼ fðx; yÞj0  x; y  1g of the replicated dynamic system
I, which are (0,0), (1,0), (1,1), (0,1), and ( x*, y*), if and only if the
desired condition x*2[0,1] and y*2[0,1] is established).
where x*¼ z½s1C3þs24ðq2q1ÞþkDð1el1Þ 
þC1ð1l1ÞR1þR2l1R3l2Fþð1l1ÞðEL1ÞkDð1el1Þ
Fð1l2Þ
and y* ¼ ð1l2ÞðC2L2þGFÞð1l2ÞðGFÞ
Proof 4. Let each of the equation in the replicated dynamic sys-
tem I equal to zero, i.e., FðxÞ ¼ 0 and FðyÞ ¼ 0 are satisfied, sepa-
rately. Subsequently, five replicated dynamic equilibrium points are
obtained.,
It is worth noting that the equilibrium point is not all ESS, since
ESS must also possess the ability to resist the error or deviation
caused by bounded rationality, i.e., the ability to recover to a stable
point after disturbance. As such, Friedman (1998) pointed out that
the local asymptotic stability method can be used for Jacobian
matrix to ascertain whether the evolutionary system’s equilibrium
point is stable. Taking the derivative with respect to x and y using
the replicator dynamic equation in Eq. (5) and Eq. (10) to determine
the final ESS in the game, then the Jacobian1( J1) matrix can be
obtained as follows:
J1 ¼

vX=vx vX=vy
vY=vx vY=vy

¼

p1 p2
p3 p4

(16)
then,
p1 ¼ ð1 2xÞ½yð1 l2ÞðG FÞ þ ð1 l2Þð  C2 þ L2  Gþ FÞ 
(17)
p2 ¼ xð1 xÞð1 l2ÞðG FÞ (18)
p3 ¼ yð1 yÞFð1 l2Þ (19)
p4 ¼ ð1 2yÞfxFð1 l2Þ  z½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ
þkDð1 el1Þ   C1ð1 l1Þ þ R1  R2 þ l1R3 þ l2F
ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þg
(20)
The determinant (det) and trace (tr) of J1are as follows:
detJ1 ¼ p1p4  p2p3 (21)
trJ1 ¼ p1 þ p4 (22)
When detJ1 >0 and trJ1 <0 are satisfied, it is considered that the
fixed point of the locally asymptotically stable method corresponds
Fig. 6. Dynamic evolution diagram of strategies between two level government.
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when the evolution strategy reaches a steady state, that is, dx=dt <0
and dy=dt >0. Thus, according to the different range of parameters,
the stability of the evolutionary equilibrium between two level
governments can be further studied. In order to facilitate the
observation of the calculation results, u1 ¼
ð1 l2Þð  C2 þ L2  Gþ FÞ, u2 ¼ ð1 l2Þð  C2 þ L2Þ, u3 ¼
F  z½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þ   C1ð1 l1Þ þ R1  R2 þ
l1R3  ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þ and u4 ¼ z½s1C3 þ s24ðq2 
q1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þ   C1ð1 l1Þ þ R1  R2 þ l1R3 þ l2F  ð1 l1ÞðE
L1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þ are hypothesized, respectively, which meet
u3 >u4, as shown in Table 4.
From Figs. 3 and 4 and Table 4, the dynamic evolution diagram
of two level government strategiescan be further drawn, as shown
in Fig. 6.
Let the replicated dynamic system (II) is treated as the
combining of Eq. (9) and Eq. (14), i.e., the strategies of LGs and PEs
are regarded as a replicated dynamic system, then Proposition 5 is
obtained below.
Proposition5. The equilibrium points of replicated dynamic sys-
tem (II) that exist in the plane Q ¼ fðy; zÞj0  y; z  1g among LGs
and PEs, which are (0,0), (1,0), (1,1), (0,1), and ( y, z), if and only if
the desired condition y2[0,1]and z2[0,1] is established.
where. y ¼ ð1l3ÞðC34q1Þel1kD
s1C3þs24ðq2q1ÞþkDð1el1Þ and z
 ¼
xFð1l2ÞC1ð1l1ÞþR1R2þl1R3þl2Fð1l1ÞðEL1ÞþkDð1el1Þ
s1C3þs24ðq2q1ÞþkDð1el1Þ .
Proof 5. For the replicated dynamic system (II) be FðyÞ ¼ 0 and
FðzÞ ¼ 0, then five equilibrium points that meet above conditions,
including (0,0), (1,0), (1,1), (0,1) and ( y, z).
Further, Jacobian2( J2) matrix can also be acquired by derivative
with respect to y and z, from the replicator dynamic equation in Eq.
(10) and Eq. (15), respectively.
J2 ¼

vY=vy vY=vz
vZ=vy vZ=vz

¼

p5 p6
p7 p8

(23)
where
p5 ¼ ð1 2yÞfxFð1 l2Þ  z½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ
þkDð1 el1Þ   C1ð1 l1Þ þ R1  R2 þ l1R3 þ l2F
ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þg
(24)
p6 ¼ yðy 1Þ½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þ  (25)
p7 ¼ zð1 zÞ½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þ  (26)
p8 ¼ð1 2zÞfy½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ þ kDð1 el1Þ   ð1 l3Þ
ðC3  4q1Þ þ el1kD g
(27)
The determinant (det) and trace (tr) of J2 are as follows:
detJ2 ¼ p5p8  p6p7 (28)Table 4
Stability analysis between the CG and LGs.
Equilibrium point ðx;yÞ Determinant symbol of J1 Trace s
(0, 0) þ -
(0, 1) þ -
(1, 0) þ -
(1, 1) þ þ
(x*, y*) 0 0trJ2 ¼ p5 þ p8 (29)
When detJ2 >0 and trJ2 <0 are satisfied, the fixed point of the
locally asymptotically stable will correspond to ESS and meets dy=
dt <0 and dz=dt >0. Likewise, according to the different values of
relevant parameters, the stability of the evolutionary equilibrium
between LGs and PEs can be further analyzed. Suppose that u7 ¼
xFð1 l2Þ C1ð1 l1Þþ R1  R2 þ l1R3 þ l2F  ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þþ
kDð1 el1Þ, u8 ¼ s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ þkD ð1 l3ÞðC3  4q1Þ
and u9 ¼  ð1 l3ÞðC3  4q1Þþ el1kD, separately, and meet u6 <
u7 and u8 <u9, see Table 5.
From Figs. 4 and 5 and Table 5, the dynamic evolution diagram
of strategies between LGs and PEs can be depicted, as shown in
Fig. 7.
From the evolutionary stability conditions of the above stepwise
analysis, it can be concluded that the evolutionary equilibrium
regulatory decisions between x and y varies with the proportion of
z reduction strategies in the evolution process. Similarly, the
evolutionary equilibrium regulatory between y and decisions z
changes with the proportion of x. It is worth mentioning that the
values of z and x vary with changes in the evolutionary process,
while the equilibrium state of the game system does not possess
the robustness to handle the small perturbations between z and x.
Therefore, it is unable to drive the tripartite mainstay to the ex-
pected steady state by only adjusting the initial parameters. This
study aims to promote the three game agents ultimately evolved
into the research that proposed to form a low-carbon operation
mode with a central-oriented, local-positive response, with
enterprise-emission reduction (Bao et al., 2008), the ideal decision
state namely x¼1, y¼1, z¼1. Here, combined with Eq. (4) and
Fig. 6(d3), it is concluded that the condition ð1 l2ÞðL2  C2Þ>0
can keep x increasing monotonically and trending toward to x¼1.
Thus, by defining the initial threshold of ~x, it can maintain the
evolutionary conditions of xFð1 l2Þ ½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ  
C1ð1 l1Þþ R1  R2 þ l1R3þ l2F  ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ>0and s1C3 þ
s24ðq2  q1Þþ kD ð1 l3ÞðC3  4q1Þ>0, so that the tripartite
game agents finally evolve into x¼1, y¼1, z¼1.4. Numerical example
4.1. Case description and parameter settings
The results presented thus far entirely analytical but on con-
structs. A numerical example may thus serve to illustrate howymbol of J1 Results Stability condition
ESS u1 <0, u4 <0
Unstable Any condition is not stable
ESS u1 >0, u3 <0
ESS u2 >0, u3 >0
Saddle point 0, 0
Table 5
Stability analysis between LGs and PEs.
Equilibrium point ðy;zÞ Determinant symbol of J2 Trace symbol of J2 Results Stability condition
(0, 0) þ - ESS u7 <0, u9 <0
(0, 1) þ þ Unstable Any condition is not stable
(1, 0) þ - ESS u7 >0, u8 <0
(1, 1) þ þ ESS u6 >0, u8 >0
(y , z) 0 0 Saddle point 0, 0
Fig. 7. Dynamic evolution diagram of strategies between LGs and PEs.
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and convergence trends for multi-agents in an empirical setting. In
order to obtain higher profits and reduce manufacturing waste, a
growing number of enterprises in China are realizing the impor-
tance of emission reductions. In response to the central govern-
ment's call for “accelerating the development of ecological
civilization” in the 13th five-year plan outline of China, the Hunan
Province LG has identified the Xiangjiang River as its “No.1 Project”
for advancing environmental protection and governance.
As the largest steel and iron manufacturing enterprise in Hunan
Province, V Enterprise has actively participated in the provincial
government's “No.1 Project”. Tightly coupledmitigation action by V
Enterprises and the local regulator have led to the achievement of
near complete recovery of wastewater pollution from blast furnace
converters. Industrial clean-up has led to significant improvement
in regional environmental quality. In recognition of its private
sector leadership, V Enterprise was certified as a National Leader in
Energy Saving Emission Reductions in 2017.
Based on in-person investigations in Hunan Province, including
on-the ground interviews the relevant government department
and V Enterprise, the regulatory and abatement costs are denoted
as C1 ¼ 3 and C3 ¼ 5, respectively. Observed levels for regulatory
effort and emission reduction meet the condition l1 ¼ 0.29 and
l3 ¼ 0.31. To simulate gamewith these parameters that evolves into
an ideal state - in which all three players select the 1:1:1 strategy,
the following constellation of parameters values are kept as a
benchmark: C2 ¼ 2, R1 ¼ 2, R2 ¼1, R3 ¼ 3, F ¼ 5, E¼ 3, D¼ 2, L1 ¼ 4,
L2 ¼ 5, q1 ¼ 3, q2 ¼ 5, l2 ¼ 0.35, s1 ¼ 0.4, s2 ¼ 0.3, 4¼ 0.6, e¼ 0.68,
k¼ 0.47, ~x¼0.2. The foregoing initial parameter settings satisfy the
following evolution conditions: ð1 l2ÞðL2  C2Þ>0,
xFð1 l2Þ  ½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ   C1ð1 l1Þ þ R1  R2
þl1R3 þ l2F  ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ>0
and s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þþ kD ð1 l3ÞðC3  4q1Þ>0.
4.2. The impact of selecting an initial change of strategy on
evolutionary results
Under the conditions of the above initial setting, when the initial
value of y and z are fixed, the initial value of x is randomly selected
within the threshold ~x as the lower limit to verify the effect of the
initial value of xon its own evolutionary trend, as illustrated in
Fig. 8(f1) (f2) (f3). Under the premises that meet the above-mentioned evolutionary conditions and if x is greater than the
threshold ~x, xshows a monotonically increasing trend with the
changingof t, and the convergencedirectionof x is related tovelocity
of y and z. That is, under the condition of fixed y, the larger z is, the
slightly slower x converges but with little change, finally evolving
into the ideal steady state. In the fixed condition of z, the greater is y,
the sooner x converges to the ideal state. The initial value of y and z
has little effect on the velocity change of x but eventually
approaching to the extreme value 1 after a period of evolution. This
means that the rate of central regulation will continue to rise with
tand the CG will eventually take initiative regulatory decisions.
Simultaneously, with the premise of x> ~x, the initial value of x
and z are randomly selected to verify their impact on y, as illus-
trated in Fig. 8(g1) (g2) (g3). Under the condition of fixed x, the
larger z is, the slower y converges to the ideal state. On the contrary,
in the fixed condition of z, the greater the x, the faster y approaches
1 but appears in a downward trend at one stage, which may relate
to the supervision level of the CG, resulting in LGs carrying out
negative regulation strategy and colluding with PEs. However,
under the initial conditions, y will take a full implementation
strategy eventually with the change of t.
Moreover, under the premise of greater than the threshold ~x, the
initial value of x and y can be randomly chosen to measure their
influence on z. Specific results are illustrated in Fig. 8(h1) (h2) (h3).
Under the condition of fixed x, the larger y is, the faster z ap-
proaches 1 but appears in a downward trend at one stage, which
led their own do not fit the property of monotonically increasing.
This may be closely related to the level of administrative decision
execution of their superior government, resulting in a large number
of enterprises retreating to the traditional mode of production.
Retrenchment is a common economic phenomenon.
In summary, it can be seen from Fig. 8 that the evolutionary
results and the convergence rate among these three agents are
affected by the initial proportion of each subject's choice. Further-
more, each is influenced by the initial probabilities by which the
other two players choose the equilibrium state strategy. This is to
say that the strategy evolution path between each agent has a
reliable degree of interdependence.
4.3. The impact of selecting a parameter change of strategy on
evolutionary results
Under the premise that the benchmark parameters of the
example remain unchanged, an isolate increase in the subsidy
reward for pollution reduction s2 will not change the direction in
which the PEs finally converges to the equilibrium state, as shown
in Fig. 9. However, higher subsidies significantly slow the pace of
convergence of both PEs and LGs towards the ideal state, as higher
subsidies inhibit the expected income of LGs. In effect, higher
reliance on subsidies appears to diminish the enthusiasm of regu-
latory forces. Due to the fall in the expected earnings of local
agencies, the scale of enterprises within their jurisdiction will be
further reduced, so as to the profit of PEs.
In the next panel, Fig. 10 explores a case where the LG does not
actively regulate pollution within its jurisdiction despite an
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Fig. 8. The impact of selecting an initial change of strategy on the evolutionary results.
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Fig. 9. The impact of s2 on evolutionary results.
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Fig. 10. The impact of F on evolutionary results.
K. Jiang et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 214 (2019) 902e915912increase in penalties imposed by the central administration F ,
holding all other parameters unchanged. A comparison with Fig. 8
indicates that the CG may do well to increase the degree of pun-
ishment when LGs do not undertake initiative to implement
emissions control. However, while increased penalties do not
change the direction of LG convergence, they do appear to slow the
game's evolution towards the desired equilibrium state. This is maybe due to short-term dynamics bywhich local agencies compensate
for penalty losses by reducing environmental implementation costs
and increasing rent-seeking. These potentially perverse outcomes
in local environmental governance in turn cause the CG to incur
increased environmental management costs. As such, the central
administration may increase its utility through an initial and
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Fig. 13. The impact of l3 on evolutionary results.
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decision-making.
When LGs intensifies their enforcement, i.e., only increasing the
value of parameter l1, other parameters are the same as Fig. 8, it
does not change the path of PEs away from eventually converging
into the equilibrium state, as shown in Fig. 11. Rather, intensified
enforcement appears to slow the evolution of the game towards the
ideal state. It appears that periods of extensive growthmay increase
the “chips” for the political promotion of local officials. However,
from a long-term perspective, environmental governance repre-
sents an investment in “soft” public goods whose longer cycles and
consumer characteristics less directly affect the production func-
tion of officials' jurisdiction. This explains the slowing in the rate of
convergence. Only when the environmental performance of the CG
in terms of achievements in the appraisal system really affects the
interests of LGs will regulators see stronger incentives to ramp up
implementation.
As the environmental regulation effort of the CG l2 increases, it
does not change the direction of LGs, which eventually converges
into the equilibrium state, but will delay the speed of their evolu-
tion to the equilibrium state, and the evolution rate of the CG itself
also becomes slower simultaneously, as shown in Fig. 12. Consid-
ering the Chinese fiscal decentralization, the two-class govern-
ments possess obvious characteristics of information asymmetry,
which in turn leads to the central cannot intuitively monitor the
extent of local implementation. In particular, the independent
decision-making behavior between two-level governments leads to
the supervision falling into the plight of individual rationality and
collective rational conflict, which makes it impossible for regula-
tion to achieve common optimization at the same time.
In the case of the benchmark parameters of the example, only
increasing the abatement intensity of PEs l3 will not change the
direction of the game state that eventually converges to the
balanced state. However, it accelerates the speed of their evolution
to the equilibrium state, while the evolution of the local govern-
ment remains relatively slow, as shown in Fig. 13. In the face of the
Chinese financial decentralization, emission-cutting work is still
dominated by administrative means, which merely relies on
energy-saving and emission reduction targets to counteract the
constraints of LG and corporate behavior. It has not yet transformed
completely into the enterprises' conscious action, nor the forma-
tion of effective market behavior. Eventually, great differences still
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Fig. 11. The impact of l1 on evolutionary results.
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Fig. 12. The impact of l2 on evolutionary results.economic development.5. Results and discussion
The results derived from the comprehensive simulation anal-
ysis, including various factors faced by the three game agents, have
reference value for the practical application of the CG, LGs and PEs.
First, the analysis reveals the importance of the probabilities
describing the likelihoods the various agents will pursue their
respective strategies to the equilibrium outcome and convergence
speed of the game. Analyzing the game's dynamic equilibrium
reveal show differences in the initial points and values of the game
system produce various counter-balancing patterns effects that
shape the players' commitments to environmental action. From a
long-term perspective, the selection of regulatory strategies proves
a dynamic process of mutual adjustment and change based in
constant adjustment. Optimization hinge on the shifts in internal
and external factors including degrees of reward and punishment,
cross-scale competition strategies, decision-making styles, and or-
ganization capacities to reduce emissions and modify counter-
parties' incentives.
Second, this study shows that the evolution and the conver-
gence of strategies among agents exhibits a reliable degree of
interdependence. When fixing the emission-reductions of PEs, this
study work shows that greater levels of LG commitment to
implementation accelerate the convergence of CG strategy towards
the ideal state of full supervision. Conversely, the higher the level of
CG enforcement, the faster LGs strategy converges towards full
implementation. Lastly, when fixing the level of CG enforcement,
greater commitment to implementation on the part of LGs speeds
the evolution of PE strategy towards the pursuit of more robust
emission reductions.
Third, defining initial thresholds sheds light on sufficient con-
ditions that appear to promote more rapid convergence of the
three-party game towards an ideal state. The specific evolutionary
requirements are ð1 l2ÞðL2  C2Þ>0,
xFð1 l2Þ  ½s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þ   C1ð1 l1Þ þ R1  R2
þ l1R3 þ l2F  ð1 l1ÞðE  L1Þ>0
and s1C3 þ s24ðq2  q1Þþ kD ð1 l3ÞðC3  4q1Þ>0. When these
constraints are met, the expected loss of the CG's supervisory
negligence outweighs its enforcement costs, the fines for LGs are
higher than the combination of cost inputs and subsidies when
regulatory policy is completely enforced, and firms' rewards (net of
fines) outweigh the costs of investing in cleaner production. Under
these conditions, the three game players evolve reliably towards
the ideal state of central enforcement, local implementation and
corporate mitigation.
Forth, under any initial condition, x¼ 0, y¼ 0 or y¼ 0, z¼1 is
not the ultimate stable state of evolution. Specifically, combining
Eq. (5), Eq. (10), Eq. (15) and a local stability analysis of the evolu-
tionary strategy makes clear that many factors exist that affect the
interaction among the three agents. A change in a random factor
K. Jiang et al. / Journal of Cleaner Production 214 (2019) 902e915914will cause one of the other parties to alter their selection strategy,
changing the tripartite strategy choice, and leading the model to
evolve towards an unstable strategy.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
6.1. Conclusions
This study takes China's fiscal decentralization system as an
entry point, and constructs an asymmetric dynamic game model of
the CG, LGs and PEs to explore the implementation process of
multi-agent environmental regulation strategies. According to the
replicator dynamic equations, the evolution of different partici-
pants' behavior and their ESS are separately discussed. The relative
commitments of different agents to their respective enforcement
strategies prove the central factor influencing the outcome of the
interdependent strategic game. Further, the strategy evolution path
and convergence speed between the three players exhibits a
consistent degree of interdependence.
Then, a numerical example based on observed conditions in
Hunan Province serves to verify the theoretical results. By defining
initial thresholds based on real-world observations of an ideal case,
sufficient conditions can be obtained to promote the evolution of
the three-party game to the long-term ideal state. In the context of
fiscal decentralization, it appears impossible for LGs to persist in a
“race to the bottom” in the absence of minimal central regulation,
or for polluting enterprises to sustain a strategy of unchecked
emissions for a protracted period of time.
6.2. Implications
To advance the efficient implementation of environmental
regulation in China and encourage a more benign transformation of
economic growth towards social performance, several policy im-
plications based on the findings appear clear and straightforward.
First, the strategic choice of the CG hinges on setting levels of
enforcement supervision and fines. Meanwhile, the excessively
high cost of full enforcement by the CG makes it difficult to
comprehensively supervise the implementation behavior of local
officials increases information asymmetry between the two-level
governments. Therefore, additional third-party regulatory mecha-
nisms, such as the general public, media, and wide range of non-
governmental organizations may prove useful to supplement
state-driven environmental monitoring, reduce the central gov-
ernments enforcement costs, and so enhance society's overall
regulatory efficiency.
Second, from a policy-making perspective, while penalties for
local government failures to implement environmental regulation
appear ripe for strengthening, it appears necessary to first improve
environmental laws and regulations. Improving norms to celebrate
the enforcement of the rule of law and the moral value of foregoing
collusive behavior on the part of civil servants, LGs will more
readily execute regulatory policies. Restrictions on opportunistic
forms of government-enterprise cooperation will enhance envi-
ronmental outcomes and accelerate societal shifts towards a
cleaner economy.
Third, given that the strategic choices of LGs are shaped by
political losses, management capability, bribes, and the degree of
regulatory efforts, it is essential to reform the current regime for
local government performance appraisal. A more scientific frame-
work for assessing environmental performance that leverages in-
dicators such as pollutant emission intensity, environmental
quality changes, total pollutant discharge, and public satisfactionshould be incorporated into the evaluation system to increase the
political costs of non-implementation of environmental laws. The
weighting coefficient of environmental quality index in the per-
formance evaluation system should be increased accordingly, and
the CG should place greater emphasis on assessing environmental
quality in assessing the tenure of local officers.
Fourth, increasing rewards for LGs that earnestly implement
environmental regulations alongside greater punishments for of-
ficials who prove tolerant of corporate pollution will correct the
mindset that GDP is the only standard with which to measure
development and government performance. Financial approaches
including subsidies, fiscal transfers, and grants to offset costs of
regulatory implementation should prove effective tools to nudge
LGs towards a strategic equilibrium favoring environmental pro-
tection. In general, the central government's strategy towards
provincial governments might do best to employ a “carrots first,
sticks second” approach to obtain the most rapid and efficient
change to a complex regulatory equilibrium.
Fifth, firm-level strategies appear consistently influenced by
emission tax rates, penalties, and the signaling of a credible
commitment by the local regulator to enforce environmental laws.
Therefore, from a marketing perspective, governmental sectors
with higher position and greater power should continue to signal
the imminent establishment of a robust emission trading system
and science-based standards for industrial and municipal effluent.
Trading systems in particular show promise for facilitating efficient
balancing of penalties, incentives, and market transactions so as to
raise the efficiency of emission reduction within the overarching
political economy of industrial pollution.
Finally, governmental departments should consider active
experimentation with localized, market-driven mechanisms to
promote a transition from environmental regulation costs “external
negative effect” to an “internal positive effect” of profit-sharing
between firms and local officials in the transition to a cleaner
economy. Subsidy rewards should be focused accordingly to reward
firm-level leadership in emission reductions based particularly on
ecological R&D, so as to maximize enthusiasm for low-emission
innovation and weaken incentives for “free-riding” on vanguard
reductions among corporate competitors.
6.3. Limitations
This study contends with several limitations. When the game
model converges on the ideal state, this study reveals only the
sufficient e though potentially non-essential - stability conditions.
The current work remains unable to complete summarize the sta-
ble equilibrium conditions for the general three-dimensional
evolutionary game model. In the long term, the realistic choice of
environmental regulation strategy is likely to prove a more dy-
namic change process over time, marked by persistent adjustment
and mutual optimization according to the transformation of inter-
nal and external factors including changing reward and punish-
ment levels, local competitive strategies, official decision-making
style, and shifts in corporate capacities. Such problems will provide
ample challenge for forthcoming studies.
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